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Legal and Professional Issues 
in Teacher-Certification Testing: 
A Psychometric Snark Hunt 
George F. Madaus 
Boston College 
But the Snark is at hand, let me tell you again! 
'Tis your glorious duty to seek it! 
To seek it with thimbles, to seek it with care; 
To pursue it with forks and hope; 
But the Judge said he never had summed up before; 
So the Snark undertook it instead, 
And summed it so well that it came to far more 
Than the Witnesses ever had said 
But the valley grew narrow and narrower still, 
And the evening got darker and colder, 
Till (merely from nervousness , not from goodwill) 
They marched along shoulder to shoulder 
-Lewis Carroll (1975) 
The Hunting of the Snark; An Agony in Eight Fits 
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The validation of teacher-certification tests has become a snark 
hunt. The snark pursued by test contractors however, is not nearly 
as elusive, nor fanciful as Carroll's shadowy beast. Their snark is a 
"legally defensible" test. Test contractors are-merely from ner-
vousness (not from goodwill)-marching along shoulder to shoul-
der with jurists. I will argue that hunting the shadowy snark 
through the dark wood of the court room cheapens the concep-
tualization of validity and delimits the conduct of validation stud-
ies to minimalist exercises designed to obtain a positive result. 
I start from the basic premise that the most important feature of 
any test is the accuracy of the inferences or decisions made from 
the score. Countless generations of measurement students have 
been taught the old saw: A test can be reliable but not valid, but if 
it's valid, it has to be reliable. Here I argue that a test can be 
legally defensible but not valid. However, if the results from a well-
designed validation process, on balance support the inferences or 
decisions made on the basis of the test, legal defensibility should 
be satisfied. Legal defensibility is important. Tests must be able to 
stand court scrutiny. However, I contend, we have the cart before 
the horse-whatever courts will accept drives current validation 
practices. Legal precedent is circumscribing inquiry about the es-
sential question underlying all testing- "how correct are the in-
ferences made from a person's score?" 
The vulnerability of testing companies engaged in this legal 
snark hunt consists in their readiness to view their task no more 
broadly than that of satisfying the desire of state agencies for legal-
ly defensible certification tests. Some contractors are in danger of 
becoming ambidextrous yes men for states. l Testing companies, of 
course, insist on test validity. However, faced with the exigencies 
of the applied world- legal precedent, contract obligations, tena-
cious timelines, and budget limitations-they offer excuses to ab-
solve themselves from gathering construct and criterion-related 
evidence related to their products. They have built a tunnel 
through a mountain of precepts about validity which are regularly 
taught students in test and measurement classes. They take the 
law of validity literally, but argue that the letter is elastic, plead-
IThere are notable exceptions. ETS refused to bid on the lucrative Texas and Arkan-
sas recertification testing program becayse, as Gregory Anrig publicly pointed out, 
the NTE tests should not be used for decisions regarding retention or termination. 
The Guidelines For Proper Use of NTE Tes/s, states that such decisions: "about in-
service teachers should be based on teaching competencies as determined directly 
by the supervisory and evaluation procedures of the employing school district" 
(NTE Policy Council, 1985, p. 7). 
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ing for leniency from basic precepts and strictures. The companies 
deny that their product purports to measure a complex con-
struct-a subset of competence in the classroom. 
This behavior of test contractors is a reaction to the following 
factors: 
• the mandates of policy makers for a quick, visible, quantifia-
ble, and administratively convenient fix to a perceived prob-
lem with the quality of the teaching corps 
• a naive confidence on the part of policy makers and the public 
that multiple-choice tests can improve the quality of the 
teacher corps 
• a lack of understanding on the part of policy makers and the 
public, concerning the kinds of evidence needed to support the 
inferences they wish to make about teacher candidates 
• the bureaucratic nature of the state agencies charged with 
implementing the mandate of policy makers 
• the funding level and lead time available to implement a sys-
tematic validation effort 
• the applied, commercial nature of the testing industry 
• the selection of contractors through the competitive, low-bid 
RFP process 
• the allegiance of testing companies to the state agency that 
awards the contract, rather than to examinees who later pay 
to sit the exam, or the general public who often base their 
perceptions of educational quality on test scores 
• the evolution of a set of tried and true procedures for gather-
ing content validation evidence that redounds to confirmation 
rather than disconfirmation 
• the vested interest of policy makers in vigorously defending 
their programs when legally challenged 
• the competitive, adversarial nature of litigation that colors 
arguments on both sides about scientific-technical issues 
• the existence of legal precedent about what is sufficient to 
justify the use of employment tests 
I was asked to address the professional and legal implications of 
teacher-certification testing. This chapter, therefore, consists of 
two distinct sections. In the first section, I examine the legal chal-
lenges to teacher-certification tests. I offer examples of how testing 
experts operate within the legal arena. In this first section validity 
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issues are interpreted from the legal rather than psychometric tra-
dition. I begin by describing two types of legal challenges to teach-
er-certification tests and illustrate the part experts from the psy-
chometric community play in these legal challenges. I conclude 
the first section with a description of the formula for a legally 
defensible teacher-certification test that has emerged from court 
decisions. 
In the second section I leave behind the legal tradition and ex-
amine the validity issues surrounding teacher certification testing 
from the professional point of view. I begin by offering examples of 
the inferences and decisions made by various publics from scores 
on teacher certification. I then develop the psychometric implica-
tions for validation that flow from these inferences, and the prob-
lems associated with them in the applied situation. Next, I discuss 
issues related to the mix of content, construct, and criterion-relat-
ed evidence that I feel is necessary if we are to understand what we 
are measuring and ' basing important certification decisions on. 
Finally, because the cut-score is the trigger for any inference or 
decision about teachers, I raise issues related to its validity. 
Before I begin, two caveats. First, my treatment of litigation is 
strictly that of layman. My credentials consist of a single week in 
law school before leaving for the army, a decision I've never regret-
ted. Second, I have a bias about high-stakes tests . If the use of a test 
has the potential to harm, or has serious consequences for indi-
viduals, the test should be subjected to a thoroughgoing validation 
before it is used operationally. Teacher-certification tests certainly 
trigger this bias. Large numbers of examinees are affected, partic-
ularly large numbers of minorities. From my perspective, the pro-
tection of the individual takes precedent over the state's interests 
until the state can demonstrate that the test, although not erro~ 
free, does a reasonably good job of identifying individuals who in 
all likelihood lack the necessary skills or knowledge to be mini-
mally successful in the classroom. The last clause anticipates my 
later argument that teacher certification tests are really about a 
candidate's competence in the classroom. 
THE BASIS FOR LEGAL CHALLENGES 
I shall concentrate on two theories under which teacher-certifica-
tion tests are challenged: (a) the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution; and (b) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I do 
not attempt to analyze the extensive case law on which these theo-
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ries are based. Instead, I will use plaintiffs' briefs in Allen v. The 
Alabama State Board of Education, (1985), and The Georgia Associa-
tion of Educators v. State of Georgia (plaintiffs' brief, 1987) to illus-
trate the way they were recently used to challenge two teacher 
certification-testing programs.2 
The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution 
The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution provide the first grounds for legal 
challenges to teacher-certification tests. Either can be used on be-
half of an examinee to challenge the use of a test for entry to the 
profession as an arbitrary, irrational, or unreasonable governmen-
tal action. Thus, for example, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners 
(1957) the court ruled that "A state cannot exclude a person from 
the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for 
reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 238-39). 
The Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection clause applies when the government engages 
in any form of grouping to determine differential government 
treatment of individuals. Once grouping occurs, courts ask, "What 
is the composition of the group?" and "What is done to the indi-
vidual as a result of being placed in the group, that is to say, does it 
result in the person being stigmatized or denied a basic right such 
as freedom of speech or the right to vote?" Answers to these ques-
tions determine which of three forms of scrutiny of evidence the 
court will consider in examining the case: (a) If a racial group is 
affected adversely, or if a fundamental right guaranteed under the 
constitution is denied on the basis of being placed in a particular 
group, the claim receives strict scrutiny. Where racial grouping 
occurs it is necessary for plaintiffs to show that grouping was in-
tentionally race based. Further, the court looks to see that the 
government is pursuing a compelling state interest and that no 
2The reader is warned that I have worked for the Plaintiffs on both of these cases 
and that although I have tried to report objectively on the "facts" my possible bias 
should be noted. I have used the following documents in what follows . Allen v. The 
Alabama Slate Board of Education Plaintiffs" and Plaintiff-Interveners' Joint Pro-
posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Civil Action 81-697-N in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama Northern District. 
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reasonable alternative is less discriminatory. (b) If there is group-
ing not based on race, or if no fundamental right is denied, the case 
receives a relatively simple scrutiny. The question the court ad-
dresses under this analysis is whether the government is pursuing 
a legitimate governmental interest and doing it in a rational, non-
arbitrary, noncapricious way. (c) Intermediate judicial scrutiny 
falls between simple and strict. It is used in cases where a well-
defined nonracial group is affected or where a fundamental right 
isn't involved, and the issue has important social significance. 
Courts have applied the intermediate scrutiny criterion in sex-
discrimination and school-finance cases. 
The Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause applies when there is governmental depri-
vation of a life, liberty, or a property interest. For example, veteran 
teachers have a property interest in maintaining their jobs. Recer-
tification testing could deprive them of this property interest. 
There are two types of due process : substantive and procedural. 
Substantive due process asks whether a governmental action is 
just, or fundamentally fair. Arguing that substantive due process 
has been violated in a teacher-testing case involves demonstrating 
that the use of the test is so arbitrary and so capricious that it 
bears no relationship to the state 's objective. This is obviously 
extremely difficult to prove . Procedural due process asks whether 
the government went about its decision making in a systematic 
manner designed to minimize mistakes. Procedural due process 
also affords citizens an opportunity to have advance notice of, and 
an opportunity to influence, important government decisions that 
affect them. 
Allen v. The Alabama State Board of Education (1985) is il-
lustrative of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Alabama re-
quired that candidates for initial teacher certification pass a test of 
professional knowledge and a test specific to their certification 
area. Plaintiffs challenged the state 's testing regulation by arguing 
that the tests employed: 
were fundamentally flawed, varied from sound psychometric guide-
lines, and violated basic principles of fairness . Consequently , defen-
dants' classification of teacher applicants who have failed to achieve 
their cut-off score on these examinations is irrational and violates 
the equal protection and due process rights of the class. (p . 31) 
The plaintiffs, relying heavily on precedent from Debra P. v. 
Turlington (1979),-the Florida minimum competency graduation 
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testing case-challenged the testing program III part on pro-
cedural due process grounds: 
[the] defendants hasti ly concocted and implemented these tests as 
an absolute requirement for teacher certification in a period not 
exceeding 18 months. The tests were in fact used as a requirement for 
certification only some three months after their construction, the first 
opportunity to provide students notice of their content [italics added] . 
Under these circumstances defendants' implementation schedule of 
the test provided the plaintiff class insufficient notice, thereby vio-
lating their rights to due process under the fourteenth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. (Plaintiffs & Plaintiff-Inter-
venors', 1986 p. 39). 
Plaintiffs in Allen vs. State Board developed their Fourteenth 
Amendment claim further using opinions from Debra P. (1981). 
First, they asserted that: 
Just as successful completion of a high school program creates a 
"state-created understanding" that one will receive a diploma, suc-
cessful completion of a state-approved teacher training program cre-
ates such an understanding that one will receive a teaching certifi-
cate. (Plaintiffs' & Plaintiff-Intervenors', 1986, p. 33- 34) 
Second, using language directly from Debra P. plaintiffs asserted 
that a state-required examination used to deny persons a classifi-
cation to which they have a property r ight or a limited interest 
must be "a fair test of that which is taught in its classrooms." (644 
F.2d 408) Third they cited the following ruling from Debra P. to 
argue that Alabama had violated due process: "If the test covers 
material not taught the students, it is unfair and violates the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion." (644 F2d 408) . Plaintiffs argued that because the testing 
program had a disparate racial impact, their Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim should receive strict scrutiny. Finally, given disparate 
impact the defendants have the burden of proving that the exam-
ination was in fact a fair test of matters actually taught in the 
classrooms of their State-approved teacher-training programs and 
that there was no reasonable alternative that would have a lesser 
discriminatory impact. 
By now readers will recognize the argument for curricular-relat-
ed validity evidence (Madaus, 1983) . Whether the Alabama tests 
had curricular validity or not isn't nearly as interesting as the 
argument that what is taught in teacher-training institutions and 
measured by multiple-choice items is, in fact, necessarily related 
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to performance in the classroom. I examine this line of argument 
in more detail later. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The most widely employed and powerful legal theory used to chal-
lenge teacher-certification tests is a claim under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII mandated nondiscrimination in 
employment by reason of race, sex, or national origin. The Act also 
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to en-
force Title VII. It is important to remember that Title VII is an 
employment statute and, therefore, covers only employment testing. 
(The bulk of testing in this country cannot be challenged under 
Title VII.) 
There are two threshold criteria that must be met by plaintiffs 
to mount a successful Title VII challenge. First, plaintiffs must 
establish that the State is an employer. (Although state employ-
ment issue has no direct psychometric implications, unless this 
first criterion is met, testing issues simply will not get heard.) 
Defendants in teacher-certification-testing cases argue that the 
State is merely a licensing board, not an employer; that teachers 
are employed by local school districts. Therefore, they contend 
that the State's certification tests can't be challenged under Title 
VII. However, in United States and North Carolina Association of 
Educators v. North Carolina (1977) and The Georgia Association of 
Educators v. State of Georgia (1987) the courts ruled that the state 
plays a pervasive role in the operation of the schools and in the 
employment of teachers. For example, in the Georgia case the 
court ruled that: 
Although the public schools in Georgia are operated by local school 
boards, the activities of the local boards are part of a state-wide 
educational program which is administered by the State and by the 
Georgia State Board of Education. The State and, in particular, the 
Board of Education, exercises authority over the local school board 
in matters that range from curriculum and program requirements to 
funding, construction of facilities, and long-range planning by local 
school systems. Under these circumstances, it cannot be determined 
as a matter of law that defendants are not "employers" for purposes 
of Title VII. (C86-2234A at 3) 
If the defendant is an "employer" under Title VII, the plaintiffs 
must meet the second precondition to Title VII coverage. They 
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must show that the tests have substantial adverse racial impact. 
The importance of this second test cannot be over emphasized. A 
shoddy, invalid teacher-certification test that fails minorities and 
nonminorities at essentially the same rate as nonminorities cannot 
be challenged under Title VII. Further, without a Title VII claim it 
is extremely difficult to challenge a defective, but nondiscrimina-
tory, test under a Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal 
protection theory. 
Once plaintiffs demonstrate adverse impact, the burden of proof 
shifts to the defendants to show the tests are "job-related" (Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 1975). Finally, if the tests are shown to 
be properly validated, the plaintiffs have an opportunity to prove 
that "other tests or selection devices without a similar undesirable 
racial effect, would serve" the defendants' purpose. (Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody, 1975) 
DETERMINING ADVERSE IMPACT 
The determination of adverse impact is made by comparing the 
selection rate for the minority group with that of the nonminority 
group. There are two ways of showing disparate impact: (a) the 
"80% rule" and (b) the "two or three standard deviation rule." 
There is, of course, extensive case law interpreting these rules, and 
learned treatises about them (e.g., Baldus & Cole, 1980; Kaye & 
Aickin, 1986). I do not attempt to review that literature. Instead, I 
use a recent challenge to a teacher-certification-testing pro-
gram-Georgia Association of Educators v. State of Georgia (1987) 
-to illustrate the role testing experts played in the determination 
of disparate impact. The Georgia case affords the reader a concrete 
glimpse of how testing experts operate in the adversarial world of 
law. 
The 80% Rule 
The "80% rule" was adopted by the EEOC as a "rule of thumb" for 
assessing adverse impact. The Question and Answers on Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP) states: 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than 
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rates for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
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fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection 
rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are signifi-
cant in both statistical and practical terms [italics added] or where a 
user's actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on 
grounds of race sex, or ethnic group. [U .S. Equal Employmen t Oppor-
tunity Employment Commission 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D] 
The 80%, or 4/5 rule, was not intended as a legal definition of 
discrimination but asa practical device to guide the EEOC in the 
use of their enforcement resources (Schlei & Grossman, 1983). Fur-
ther, as the italicized section reveals, the 80% rule is not a hard. 
and fast requirement. 
In Georgia Association of Educators v. State of Georgia (1987), 
plaintiffs pointed to data over an 88-year period, in which Whites 
took the Teacher Certification Test (TCT) a total of 57,503 times 
and passed 48,986 times, for a pass rate of 85.2%. Blacks took the 
TCT 19,826 times and passed 8,329 times, for a pass rate of 42.0%. 
Because the Black pass rate was only 49.3% of the White rate (42 -;-
85 .2 x 100)-considerably less than 80%-plaintiffs argued that 
their Title VII claim was justified (Plaintiffs' Brief In Opposition, 
1987, p. 45). Thus, in Georgia the 80% rule seemed at first glance, 
straightforward. But looks are deceiving. Two issues muddy the 
waters; both involve the testing community. 
The first issue revolves around the formulation of the com-
parison groups. Two groups were affected by the Georgia TCT: (a) 
the "Renewal Certificate Group," consisting of experienced Geor-
gia teachers seeking recertification; and (b) the "Initial Certificate 
Group," consisting of candidates applying for Georgia certification 
for the first time. Robert Rentz, an expert for the State Depart-
ment of Education, reported that his calculations showed that the 
pass rate for Blacks in both groups was more than 80% of the pass 
rates for Whites. He concluded, "no 'substantially disproportion-
ate racial impact' is evidenced" (1987a, p. 4). On the basis of the 
Rentz analysis, defendants argued that plaintiffs had no claim un-
der Title VII. 
Plaintiffs countered that an analysis by their expert, John Pog-
gio (1987a) showed that Rentz's numbers were substantially incor-
rect because of "egregious multiple counting of records" (Plaintiffs 
Brief in Opposition, 1987, p . 35). In other words, a single person 
who passed a single test was counted more than once by Rentz; 
often five or more times. Poggio also challenged Rentz's inclusion 
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of other cases in forming his groups.3 Rentz (1987b) in reply, ar-
gued that the multiple counting was the result of a single person 
using the test result to apply for more than one certificate, and 
therefore was legitimate.4 
Poggio used different inclusion rules to formulate his groups-a 
single person taking a single test was counted once-and found for 
all examinees irrespective of initial or renewable status, a ratio of 
Black pass rate to White pass rate of 74.6%; less than the magic 
80% criterion for a Title VII claim. He then calculated the ratio of 
Black to White pass rates for the Initial and Renewable groups 
separately and found the ratios to be 69.6% and 82.8%, respec-
tively. 
This interchange between testing experts over the 80% rule isn't 
offered to resolve either claim,s nor as a second edition of How To 
Lie With Statistics (Huff, 1954). Instead it illustrates how an impor-
tant legal trigger can color an expert's approach to an otherwise 
apparently "objective" set of data. 
The second issue surrounding the 80% rule is closely related to 
the group-definition issue. Given multiple retakes, when do you 
calculate your ratios to go to court? The ratio will slide with each 
retake. Because Georgia Blacks failed the TCT in greater numbers 
than Whites, the pool retaking the test for recertification became 
more and more Black over time. And with each Black passing a 
retake the 80% rule becomes harder to meet. The State, of course, 
would include as many retakes as possible before going to court. 
Plaintiffs would like to establish a temporal base line beyond 
which retakes are not considered in the calculations. 
Before leaving the '80% rule, one additional observation is in 
order. It takes no genius to recognize that the 80% rule is a func-
tion of where in the distribution the agency sets the passing score . 
Field-test data, or data from the first or second administration of 
3poggio's analysis shows that 5,782 matches in the Rentz Initial Certificate file 
were the result of multiple counting; the comparable figure for the Renewable 
Certificate file was 5,715 matches . Poggio, offered as one example of thousands of 
cases of multiple counting a Black who took the TCT Science test on only one 
occasion and passed it and was counted as a "pass" six times. (Poggio, 1987, p. 5) 
4Th us Rentz (1987b) argued that the person counted six times as a pass for the 
science test cited by Poggio could be used by an "otherwise qualified individual in 
applying for 15 different certificates, anyone of which might subsequently qualify 
that person for different job openings" (p. 1). 
SMy belief is that the Poggio analysis best reflects the situation of how Blacks 
are affected by the TCT. 
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the test, permit fine tuning the cut score so that the ratio of the 
minority pass rate to the nonminority pass rate is greater than 
80%. No one admits to this practice, but several plaintiff lawyers I 
have talked to believe that available data on the minority and 
nonminority pass rates are used to adjust the cut score after the 
fact in order to avoid a Title VII claim. 
What's wrong with adjusting the cut score to raise the pass rate 
for minorities? Nothing, if the program is viewed cynically as 
nothing more than a public relations exercise to assuage a dis-
trustful public that "incompetent" teachers will not be allowed in 
the classroom. After all, why get involved in very costly litigation if 
it can possibly be avoided by judicious choice (no pun intended) of 
a cut score from the known distributions of the two groups? How-
ever, if the question of the correctness of the inferences, decisions, 
or descriptions made from candidates' test performance is taken 
seriously, then clearly the operational cut-off score should be 
based on empirical considerations rather than on the vagaries of 
the 80% rule. I shall return to the question of validity and the cut 
score later. 
The Two or Three Standard Deviation Rule 
As we saw in the preceding section, the 80% rule is merely a guide-
line which admits of exceptions. The courts also consider tests of 
statistical significance in determining whether a selection device 
has a disparate impact. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have 
adopted the "two or three standard deviations" test first employed 
in 1977 by the Supreme Court in Castaneda v. Partida (1977). In 
recent cases these Circuits have approached the question of dispa-
rate impact solely from a standard deviation analysis (Plaintiffs 
Brief in Opposition, 1987). 
Castaneda was a case involving jury selection. The Supreme 
court ruled that a difference of two or three standard deviations (in 
reality standard errors) between the percentage of the minority 
group in a large population (the general population) and the per-
centage of minorities actually selected for jury duty is generally 
indicative of discrimination. 
Let's examine how this rule was operationalized by the experts 
in the Georgia case. Rentz (1987a) reported that Blacks in the 
Initial group constituted 12.7% of the larger population who at-
tempted the TCT, but only 10.8% of the smaller sample who 
passed: a difference of 1.9 percentage points . He then argued that 
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If the differences obtained here (1.9) were translated into standard 
deviations based on the sample size for the sample passing the TCT 
(20,660), the result would be 8.26; but if that same difference were 
translated using the same sample size as Castaneda v. Partida (e.g. 
870), the result would be 1.68. (p. 4) 
For the Renewable group the difference was 2.4, or 8.77 SDs using 
an N of 21,370, but only 1.76 SDs if adjusted to a sample size of 
870. In other words, Rentz considered the N of 870 in Castaneda v. 
Partida as normative . He reasoned that "almost any difference can 
be found to be statistically significant if the sample size is large 
enough. The question of whether or not 1.9 is reflective of 'substan-
tially disproportionate racial impact' is not a statistical question" 
(Rentz, 1978a, p. 4) Rentz was certainly correct on two points: (a) 
large samples can ensure statistical significance, and (b) the ques-
tion of what value constitutes substantial racial impact is not sta-
tistical. However, his conclusion that for both initial and renewa-
ble groups there was "no s'tatistical evidence that persuades me 
that there is a substantially disproportional racial impact result-
ing from the requirement to pass the TCT, within the framework 
of . . . Castaneda v. Partida" (p. 5) is itself a value judgment. 
Poggio (1987a) countered Rentz's acceptance of the N of 870 as 
sacrosanct: 
it makes absolutely no sense in statistical terms .. . to take the 
number of standard deviations computed on the basis of disparities 
for a sample of over 20,000 test-takers, and "translate" them into the 
number of standard deviations that would result if the same per-
centage difference has been observed in much smaller samples .... 
In as much as the difference in black/white pass rates on the TCT 
was in fact established on the basis of the performance of over 20,000 
persons, the meaning of that difference properly must be assessed in 
terms of the performance of over 20,000 people. (pp. 12-13) 
The sample size issue apart, Poggio criticized Rentz for making 
the wrong comparison. He argued that the TCT is a selection pro-
cedure, and that the EEOC's Unifonn Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures defines adverse impact for such procedures in 
terms of the difference between the selection rate of a particular 
racial group (in Georgia, Blacks) and the selection rate of the group 
with the highest selection rates (in Georgia, Whites). Poggio ar-
gued that the issue in Georgia was different from the issue in 
Castaneda. In Castaneda the issue was whether the percentage of 
minorities selected for jury duty was representative given the per-
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centage of minorities in the general population. In the Georgia case 
Poggio identified "the extent to which the black pass rate differs 
from the white pass rate" as the central issue (Poggio, 1987a, p. 
13). In other words, Poggio argued that the basic question in em-
ployment testing is not one of representation but of whether the 
test treats the two groups more or less equally. On closer examina-
tion the representation and the comparative selection methods are 
identical if the total population of examinees is made up only of 
Blacks and Whites. However, if the total population includes mem-
bers of other racial or ethnic groups, the results from the two 
approaches can differ. 
Poggio computed the number of standard deviations between 
the Black and White pass rates (Table 7.1) to answer what he saw 
to be the relevant statistical question, that is, "how likely is it that 
if selection were unbiased as to race, the Black pass rate would be 
as far below the white passrate as the data show it is in this case?" 
(p. 14). Poggio pointed out that his comparative pass rates are well 
in excess of the Supreme Court's Castaneda rule and are indicative 
of discrimination. He argued that even for the Renewal group, 
where the pass rate is slightly above the 80% rule (82.8%), the 
disparity between the two pass rates is statistically significant. 
Finally, he pointed out that even using the Rentz representation 
comparison (but without the 870 transformation) the number of 
standard deviations obtained is never less than 9.7l. 
Rentz (1987b) countered Poggio's critique with an assertion that 
an analysis of proportional representation is the appropriate com-
parison. He did not, however, develop the argument of why it was 
appropriate. Instead he argued that the important statistic to con-
sider is the absolute size of the difference between the population 
percentage (in this case Blacks taking the test) and the same 
group's proportional representation in the sample selected (i.e., 
passing the test), not the translation of this difference to standard 
deviations. 
Rentz's argument is worth closer examination. From a review of 
four cases similar to Castaneda he extracted differences between 
TABLE 7.1 
• All administrations 
• All Examinees; cumulative pass rate 
• Initial certification group; cumulative pass rate 
• Renewal certification group; cumulative pass rate 
Note. Derived from data in Pozzio 1987a 
119.70 SDs 
84.12 SDs 
77 .12 SDs 
38.86 SDs 
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Turner v. Fouche 
Whitus v. Georgia 
Sims v. Georgia 

















Note. From Supplement to Affadavit of Dr. Robert Rentz (p. 3) by R. 
Rent, 1987b, Georgia Association of Educators v. State of Georgia, 
Civil Action No. C86-2234A. 
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population percentages and the sample selected percentages. 
These are shown in Table 7.2 He concluded that an absolute dif-
ference of 19-9ive or take a few percentage points-is what the 
courts should be sensitive to. That this absolute difference is a 
better criterion than an arbitrary "standard deviation rule" which 
fluctuates with sample size.6 
Rentz then computed the equivalent differences in population 
and sample percentages for the Initial, Renewable, and All Exam-
inee groups. These data are presented in Table 7.3 a long with the 
percentage difference from Castaneda. The samples Rentz used in 
computing his differences for the Initial and Renewal groups were 
substantially different from Poggio's samples? From these data 
Rentz argued that 
None of the results in the present case are close to the magnitude of 
the results in Castaneda v. Partida. The differences I obtained for 
certificate applicants are quite small, 1.9 for Initial and 2.4 for Re-
newal applicants; .. . The difference in representation for Dr. Poggio's 
test takers is 11.1, not as small as that for applicants, but below the 
average of 19 for the four examples cited in the Supreme Court opinion. 
The 11.1 difference is even below the lowest result of the four cases cited 
[italics added]. (Rentz, 1987b, p. 7) 
Notice Rentz's use of the difference of 19 as a criterion. 
6Rentz pointed out that a difference of 40.1 obtained in Castaneda translates to 
29 standard deviations but if the sample size were to increase ten fold from 870 to 
8,700 the standard deviation would be 92. He then asked, rhetorically, if the degree 
of underrepresentation is more in the second case than the first, and answers no; 
the number 40.1 represents the degree of "underrepresentation" not the size of the 
standard deviation. 
7For example for the Initial group Poggio (1987a) reported 7,557 Blacks took the 
test and 5,003 passed (p . 20), whereas Rentz (1987b, p. 5) recorded 2,735 Blacks in 
the population of test takers of which 2,214 passed . The two experts where working 

























The problem with Rentz's absolute percentage difference crite-
rion is that it is an altogether relative, population-dependent in-
dex.s It is somewhat analogous to the test dependence of the tradi-
tional item-discrimination index. The percentage ofthe minority 
group in the overall population always sets the upper bound for 
the difference between the population percentage and the sample 
selected percentage. Thus if you were to adopt Rentz's II difference 
of 19" proposal, once the percentage of Blacks in the population 
falls below 15% you are automatically out of the Castaneda ball 
game. Table 7.3 dramatically illustrates this population depen-
dence; for the Initial certification group the highest difference you 
could possibly achieve is 12.7-and then only if no Black passed 
the test. 
Taking the ratio of the sample selection percentage to the popu-
lation percentage removes the population dependence inherent in 
the Rentz criterion. Table 7.4 presents these ratios for Castaneda, 
the four related cases, and the All Examinee group which Poggio 
developed and Rentz used in his argument. Ratios for the Initial 
and Renewable groups are not shown in Table 7.3 because of the 
large discrepancy in the sample size between the Poggio and Rentz 
versions. Examination of the ratios in Table 7.4 reveals that in 
Castaneda for every two Mexican Americans in the population only 
one was selected for jury duty; for the All Examinees group in 
Georgia the ratio is also close to 2 to 1. Both in Castaneda and 
Georgia the ratio is lower than that in Turnerv. Fouche. This analy-
sis, of course, begs the question of whether the representation ap-
proach or the comparative selection approach is the correct com-
parison to make, a question ultimately for the courts, not for 
measurement experts, to ·decide.9 
81 am greatly indebted to John Poggio for the analysis that follows of the Rentz 
difference of 19 cri terion. 
9Using the All Examinee figures you can show that this ratio technique is identi-
cal to the 80% rule when there are only two groups. Both Rentz and Poggio reported 
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The analyses and arguments in the Rentz and Poggio affidavits 
offer us a glimpse into the world of the expert witness. We see two 
respected, highly qualified professionals attempt to interpret, in 
the best possible light, what appears at first blush to be simple 
court guidelines on what constitutes disparate impact. The stakes 
are extremely high in this interchange. Make no mistake! It is not 
an academic debate over what statistic to use . Without disparate 
impact, there is no Title VII claim, and questions about the valid-
ity of the test cannot be raised. And as things stand now, absent a 
Title VII claim, the contractor and agency are home free. There is 
no other forum, or independent auditing agency to which exam-
inees can bring questions about test validity. I return to this issue 
later. 
Can the profession arrive at a consensus on some of the issues 
posed in the Rentz/Poggio interchange? There could probably be 
agreement on the effect of sample size on statistical significance 
and power associated with the "standard deviation rule." We 
could probably agree on the correct definitions for the population 
and the sample selected given more than two racial groups in the 
overall population. We might even be able to agree on whether the 
absolute difference criterion of Rentz, or the ratio of sample se-
lected to population criterion described in Table 7.4 is appropri-
ate. But how large the difference or ratio should be is clearly a 
value question . Similarly, although the 80% rule is free of the 
population size problem associated with the standard deviation 
rule, the actual percentage constituting disparate impact is also a 
value question, particularly when the ratio of selection is close to 
80%. 
In the final analysis, a judge using his or her own personal 
calculus-colored by legal precedent, his or her training, tempera-
ment, history, intellect, personality, and predilections-must in-
terpret the disparate impact data from contending experts, and 
decide if an employment test is treating minorities in essentially 
the same way as it treats Whites. How did the district judge in 
Georgia interpret the Rentz/Poggio data? ' Although not ruling on 
the disparate impact issue directly, he denied the State's motion 
for partial summary judgment because "the plaintiffs have raised 
numerous genuine issues of material fact regarding the statistical 
analysis performed by Dr. Rentz and relied upon by the defen-
that for this group the selection ratio of Blacks to Whites is 49.31%. The ratio of 
Blacks selected to Blacks in the population of test takers is .566. The ratio for the 
Whites is 1.145 (85.5/74.4) . Dividing .566 by 1.145 gives you 49.31%. 
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TABLE 7.4 
Group Population % Sample % Sample/Pop. 
Castaneda 79.1% 39.0% .493 
Turner v. Fouche 60.0% 37.0% .617 
Whitus v. Georgia 27 .1% 9.1% .336 
Sims v. Georgia 24 .4% 4.7% .193 
Jones v . Georgia 19.7% 5.0% .253 
All Examinees 25 .6% 14.5% .566 
Derived from data in Rentz 1987a & b 
dants" (Order of Court, 1987, p. 4). In other words, he still had 
questions in his mind about disparate impact that have to be ar-
gued further. (The Georgia case was subsequently settled out of 
court.) 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE LEGALLY 
DEFENSIBLE TEST 
So much for legal theories used to litigate teacher-certification 
testing. I turn now to the impact of litigation on test validation. 
Reviews of employment-testing litigation in general (Novick, 
1982; Wigdor, 1982) and teacher-testing litigation in particular 
(McCarthy, 1985; NTE Policy Council, 1985) are available else-
where. Therefore, what follows is my rendering of the emergence 
from court rulings of the recipe for "legally defensible" teacher-
certification tests and the ingredients of the recipe. To reiterate, 
it's my contention that the precondition of "legal defensibility" 
drives applied validation efforts to the detriment of a careful con-
sideration of the evidence needed to sustain the inferences and 
decisions made from the test scores. The form and technique to 
construct a "legally defensible" test has almost completely over-
shadowed the essential question of the meaning behind the test 
score. What is the form and technique of "legal defensibility"? 
A legally defensible test is the product of the quasi-legal, quasi-
scientific approach of the court to employment-testing litigation 
(Schlei & Grossman, 1983). The Second Circuit in Guardians Asso-
ciation of the New York City Police Department v. Civil Service Com-
mission (1981) observed that while Title VII forces courts to con-
sider employment testing, it is not primarily a legal subject: 
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[Employment testing] is part of the general field of educational and 
industrial psychology, and possesses its own methodology, its own 
body of research, its own experts, and its own terminology. The 
translation of a technical study such as this into a set of legal princi-
ples requires a clear awareness of the limits of both testing and law. 
It would be entirely inappropriate for the law to ignore what has 
been learned about employment testing in assessing the validity of 
these tests. At the same time, the science of testing is not as precise 
as physics or chemistry, nor its conclusions as provable. While 
courts should draw upon the findings of experts in the field of test-
ing, they should not hesitate to subject these findings to both the 
scrutiny of reason and the guidance of Congressional intent. (pp. 
169-79) 
It seems jurists and legal scholars are as uncomfortable as many of 
us in testing are with courts ruling on issues of test validity. How-
ever, unfortunately, by default the court has become the arbiter of 
the EEOC Guidelines and the Standards for Educational & Psycho-
logical Testing (American Educational Research Association, Amer-
ican Psychological Association, & National Council on Measure-
ment . in Education [AERA, APA, & NCME], 1985). 
Two paths to the validation of teacher-certification tests have 
emerged from this quasi-legal, quasi-scientific crucible of the 
court room. Both must show that the test is job related. The first, 
which I call the curricular validity approach, comes out of the 
United States v. South Carolina (1978) case involving the use of the 
NTE. As we saw plaintiffs in Alabama challenged that state's 
teacher tests partly on the grounds that it lacked curricular valid-
ity. The second approach, which I label the content validity route, 
has evolved from a number of court decisions interpreting the 
concept "job relatedness" in employment testing. T:le two ap-
proaches are not qualitatively different. Both involve judgments 
by panels about the match between test items and a domain. The 
approaches differ in domain definition. 
The Curricular-Validity Approach 
In United States v. South Carolina (1977) the Justice Department 
and others challenged South Carolina's use of the NTE program 
tests for initial teacher certification, and for determining, in part, 
the salary schedule of experienced teachers. Plaintiffs proved dis-
parate impact, shifting the burden under Title VII to the defen-
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dants to demonstrate validity (i.e., job relatedness). To meet this 
burden of proof, the South Carolina commissioned ETS, the devel-
opers of the NTE, to conduct a validity study. The study sought to 
demonstrate "content validity by measuring the degree to which 
the content of tests matches the content of the teacher training 
programs in South Carolina" (United States v. South Carolina, 
1977, p. 1112). The ETS study involved 456 faculty members from 
twenty-five colleges and universities in South Carolina. The par-
ticipants, convened as members of panels and looked at the tests 
under controlled conditions and made judgments about the rela-
tionship between the tests and the curricula of teacher-training 
institutions in the state. (United States v. South Carolina 1977) 
Relying on the following passage from Washington v. Davis 
(1976), a police employment case, the lower court endorsed in 
principle the ETS decision to validate the NTE against the aca-
demic training program rather than actual job performance: 10 
[A] positive relationship between the test and training-course per-
formance was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from its 
possible relationship to actual [job] performance as a police officer 
[italics added] .... 
Nor is the construction foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.ed.2d 280 
(1975); and it seems to us the much more sensible construction of the 
job-relatedness requirement.(426 U.S. at 205-251, 96 S.Ct at 2053, 
p. 1113) 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision without 
comment. As I read this ruling, a contractor wishing to build a 
legally defensible teacher-certification test simply has to show 
that the test items correspond to skills and knowledge found in the 
state's teacher-training curricula. This isn't particularly difficult 
to do . The composition of the panels, and the techniques used to 
solicit from them the match between test items and teacher-train-
ing curricula are straightforward. Further, the methodology is rel-
atively cheap, fast, and-if the test contractor had any foresight at 
all-confirmatory. 1 1 
IOThe court also cited Washington v. Davis (1976) to dismiss the p laintiffs con-
stitutional challenge under the 14th Amendment: "The Supreme Court ' has held 
that a substantial relationship between a test and a training program-such as is 
found here [So CarolimiJ-is sufficient to withstand challenge on constitutional 
grounds" (p. 1108). 
l I lt is interesting to note that in the mid 1940s for financial reasons the NTE 
probably at the request of teacher educators increased the professional information 
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However, I know of no recent defense of a teacher-certification 
test that relies solely on this approach. Now when the curricular-
validity approach is used it is generally folded into the content-
validity approach described in the next section. Nonetheless, it is 
worth looking more closely at the legal reasoning about validity 
found in United States v. South Carolina. 
In Washington v. Davis (1976) a test of verbal skills and commu-
nication ability was used to screen applicants for a 17-week police 
academy training program. The Supreme Court accepted the 
lower court's reasoning that "the lack of job performance valida-
tion does not defeat the test, given its direct relationship to recruit-
ing and the valid part it plays in [the training regimen]" (426 U.S. 
229 at 236). 
The court seemed to brush aside the fact that the South Carolina 
examinees taking the NTE for initial certification had already suc-
cessfully completed their teacher training. Instead, the court ob-
served that the NTE, although not measuring teaching skills, "was 
a measure of the extent to which prospective teachers have mas-
tered the content of their teacher training programs" (p. 1108). The 
court also pointed to the plaintiffs acknowledgement of the impor-
tance of teacher-training programs when they proposed that grad-
uation from "an approved program alone is sufficient to protect 
the public interest" (United States vs South Carolina, 1987). 
The court also opined it was proper to use the NTE scores of 
experienced teachers for salary purposes. In doing so the court 
chose to ignore the NTE Policy Board's position that their program 
tests should not be used for such purposes: 
The current NTE Program tests were developed to provide informa-
tion about candidates' academic knowledge and skills, typically ac-
quired through a teacher-training program. They do not provide a 
direct evaluation of teaching performance. For this reason, NTE 
tests should not be used ... directly or indirectly, for decisions re-
garding retention or termination . Such decisions about in-service 
teachers should be based on teaching competencies as determined 
directly by the supervisory and evaluation procedures of the em-
ploying school district. 
Similarly, with the exception of master teacher or career ladder 
plans, NTE tests should not be used for decisions regarding compen-
sation. 
to 40% of the common exam total score, and the advisory council shifted from local 
school administrators to teacher training personnel. For a complete history of the 
development of the NTE, see Wilson (1984) . 
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The current NTE tests measure knowledge and skills needed by 
the beginning teacher; more is required of the teacher in service. 
(NTE Policy Consul 1985, p. 7-8)12 
I applaud as eminently sound and fair ETS's position on the use 
of the NTE program tests with in-service teachers. Nonetheless, 
there is a curious logical problem with the reasoning behind it that 
might explain the court's ruling . Why should the knowledge and 
skills measured by the NTE be job-related for preservice teachers 
but not for in-service teachers? The court made no such distinction 
in terms of the degree of knowledge possessed. As far as the court 
was concerned what was good for the goose was good for the 
gander: "[TJhe State could reasonably conclude that the NTE pro-
vided a reliable and economical means for measuring one element 
of effective teaching-the degree of knowledge possessed by the 
teacher" (United States v. South Carolina, 1977 p. 1109). 
It seems to me that the court did not go far enough in its analysis 
of the Washington v. Davis precedent. The reasoning found in the 
dissenting opinion makes several very telling points. First, the de-
fendants in Washington v. Davis at least offered a correlation be-
tween the admissions test and the final examination grades from 
the police training course to support their validity claim. There is 
no reference in United States v. South Carolina to any correlation 
between NTE scores and scores in either professional education 
courses, or in specific subject related academic courses. 
Second, even if such correlations had been offered, the ruling 
seems to take for granted that teacher-training curricula are rele-
vant to one's later teaching performance. The dissenting justices in 
Washington v. Davis noted that: "Sound policy considerations sup-
port the view that, at a minimum, petitioners should have been 
required to prove that the police training examinations either 
measure job-related skills or predict job performance" (Quoted in 
Schlei & Grossman 1983, p 126) They argued further that a cor-
relation between the admission test and the grades in training is 
supportive evidence only if: "(1) the training averages predict job 
performance or (2) the averages are proven to measure perfor-
mance in job-related training" (Dissenting opinion Washington v. 
Davis, quoted in Schlei & Grossman 1983, p 124) 
Grades in teacher training, like grades in other professional 
12Although I have quoted the most recent NTE guidelines, similar statements 
can be found in earlier versions and would have been policy at the time of the South 
Carolina case. 
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training programs, do not correlate highly with later job perfor-
mance. (see Haney, Madaus, & Kreitzer, 1987, for a review of this 
literature) Further, we simply take for granted that the curricula of 
teacher-training programs are related to teaching performance. I 
believe that aspects of teacher training may very well be relevant to 
job performance. Nonetheless, the question of whether those rele-
vant aspects of the training experience can be captured by a second-
ary indicator-a multiple-choice test-remains unanswered . And, 
this is precisely the validity issue. 
The dissenters in Washington v. Davis also had an excellent intu-
itive recognition the underlying construct at issue in that case: 
"[T]here is a substantial danger that people who have good verbal 
skills will achieve high scores on both tests due to verbal ability, 
rather than "job-specific ability." (426 U.S. 270)13 
In my opinion, in United States v. South Carolina the ruling sim-
ply side stepped job-relatedness and the job-specific ability issue 
raised by the dissenters in Washington v. Davis. Nonetheless, the 
South Carolina decision has provided contractors with one clear 
line of legally defensible "validity" evidence. 
The Content-Yalidity Approach 
A second, and more common route to a legally defensible teacher-
certification test is to show job relatedness through content valida-
tion. First, I review the essentials of the major cases from which 
this approach to validation has emerged to describe for the reader 
the essentials of the approach. To illustrate how the approach was 
actually implemented and then challenged in court, I outline the 
steps taken by the test contractor National Evaluation Systems in 
validating Alabama's teacher certification tests, and briefly list the 
plaintiffs objections to each step in that process. 
Unless plaintiffs can show intentional discrimination in the use 
of a test, the test will not be an issue in constitutional actions. 
(Schlei & Grossman, 1983). Thus, as we have mentioned earlier, 
the cornerstone of most challenges to an employment test is a Title 
VII claim. The first important case was Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
(1971), where the Supreme Court ruled that "If an employment 
13In terestingly Mi tchell (1985) reviewing the NTE also raise a similar construct-
re lated question about parts of the Core Battery. He suggested that different parts 
of the test may measure, "general intelligence, scholastic aptitude, overall academ-
ic achievement, and multiple-choice test item reasoning skills" rather than "mas-
tery of particular domains of curriculum such as professional education" (p. 1066). 
232 MADAUS 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be 
related to job performance [italics added], the practice is prohib-
ited" (p. 178). The Court went on to interpret the intent of Congress 
in enacting Title VII: 
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring pro-
cedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is 
giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they 
are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance [italics add-
ed]. (p. 180). 
The key question in subsequent cases became "what constitutes 
acceptable evidence that the test is job related?" In Albemarle Pa-
perCo. v. Moody (1975) the Supreme Court ruled that "[a discrimi-
natory test must be] predictive of or significantly correlated with 
[italics added] important elements of work behavior which com-
prise or are relevant to the jobs or jobs for which candidates are 
being evaluated" (422 U.S. 431). Phrases like "predictive of" and 
"correlated with" imply criterion-related validation, at least for 
someone like myself with an educational measurement back-
ground. But as I experienced first hand in Allen v. Alabama, defen-
dants in teacher-certification-test cases argue that criterion-relat-
ed validity evidence is not necessary; that content-related evidence 
is sufficient to show job relatedness. 14 
Two 1981 cases seem to be the source of the content-validity 
approach to job relatedness: (a) a Ninth Circuit ruling in Contreras 
v. City of Los Angeles (1982), an employment case involving accoun-
tants; and (b) a Second Circuit ruling in Guardians Association of 
the New York City Police Department v. Civil Service Commission 
(1981). I shall use the Guardians case to illustrate the reasoning 
underlying the content-validation approach. 
What does the content-validity approach to showing job related-
ness entail? The Second Circuit, after an interesting discussion of 
content and construct validity, distilled from the EEOC Guidelines 
14After a 6-week trial the district court did not rule because a prior sett lement 
that the State, under intense political and media pressure attempted to disown, 
was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit (No. 86-7215,1986). The sett lement is now in 
effect, and experts from both sides will attempt to build a test within its framework. 
Among other things, both sides agreed to a stricter version of the Golden Rule 
Settlement in terms of item inclusion on subsequent tests. (Recently the state 
dropped the teacher exam entirely) 
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five attributes of an exam that, notwithstanding its disparate ra-
cial impact, had sufficient content validity to be used for em-
ployment decisions: 
The first two concern the quality of the test's development: (1) the 
test-makers must have conducted a suitable job analysis, and (2) 
they must have used reasonable competence in constructing the test 
itself. The next three attributes are more in the nature of standards 
that the test, as produced and used, must be shown to have met. The 
basic requirement, really the essence of content validation, is (3) 
that the content of the test must be related to the content of the job. 
In addition, (4) the content of the test must be representative of the 
content of the job. Finally, the test must be used with (5) a scoring 
system that usefully selects from among the applicants those who 
can better perform the job. (from employment Practices Decisions, 
p. 16979) 
To understand how contractors in teacher-certification cases 
have employed these guidelines to build legally defensible tests it 
is necessary to examine more closely the steps in the job-analysis 
phase of the content-validation process just described. 
The EEOC Guidelines call for an assessment "of the important 
work behavior(s) required for successful performance and their 
relative importance" (§ 14(C)(2)). In the Guardians case, the Civil 
Service Commission went through a five-step procedure designed 
to meet this job-analysis requirement. First, the work behaviors 
were identified by extensive interviewing of job holders and super-
visors. Second, the list was reviewed by another, smaller panel of 
job holders and supervisors to add any tasks omitted, or to elimi-
nate duplicate tasks, or those so specialized that an entry-level 
person would not be expected to perform them. Third, a question-
naire was widely distributed to job holders asking them to rate 
each of the tasks on the basis of its frequency of occurrence, its 
importance, and the amount of time spent in performing it. IS The 
tasks were then clustered into related activities . Finally, each clus-
ter was analyzed by a separate panel of job holders to identify the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities for the cluster as a whole. This final 
step defined the test domain and formed the blueprint for item 
15In Guardians, 49 police officers and 49 supervisors were interviewed in step 
one; 7 of each reviewed the list in step two. 5,600 police officers were sent the 
questionnaire . 
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writing. These five steps are the skeleton of the job-analysis phase 
of the content-validity approach to job relatedness. 16 
Given the framework provided by Guardians, let us examine the 
seven steps the contractor in the Allen v. Alabama case went 
through to implement the content-validity approach, and the ob-
jections plaintiffs raised. Needless to say, the defendants stren-
uously contended each objection. The steps and the objections are 
taken directly from Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Intervenors' Joint Pro-
posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (1986). 
1. Outline Development: To begin to identify the content of each 
the 35 certification fields, the contractor reviewed state depart-
ment guidelines and school based curriculum materials for grades 
K to 12. This review lead to the generation of a topic outline for 
each certification area. Each outline included 100 to 200 topics. 
Plaintiffs argued that the contractor failed to review curricular 
material from the state's teacher-training institutions when gener-
ating topics for the Basic Professional Studies test (BPS). The BPS 
was a generic test of professional knowledge and skills which all 
teachers had to pass regardless of certification area. Thus, plain-
tiffs argued that the BPS topics lacked any relevant curricular 
basis. Plaintiffs also argued that the lack of records of any part of 
any of the topic reviews made an audit of the process impossible. 
2. Objective Development: To define the limits of each topic and 
clarify its intent, each topic was rewritten by the contractor as an 
objective. Curriculum committees composed of eight to ten Ala-
bama educators reviewed and modified the contractor's list of ob-
jectives to make them accurate, comprehensive, sufficiently specif-
ic, and unbiased. 
Plaintiffs argued that although the members of the panels were 
described as "experts" in their respective fields, the criteria for 
their expertise were unavailable. Plaintiffs also contended that the 
verbs used to define many of the objectives were broad and not 
operational. Therefore, many of the objectives that survived this 
stage were ambiguous. Further, the committees did not review the 
objectives relative to teacher-training curricula. Finally, no infor-
mation was provided on the racial composition of the panels. 
16It is worth noting that the plaintiffs in Guardians challenged the care in which 
each step of the job analysis was conducted and the Court observed that "With a job 
analysis of questionable sufficiency, the City then proceeded to the test construc-
tion stage." 
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3. Job Analysis: To further determine the job-relatedness of each 
objective that emerged from step 2, a list of the objectives for each 
certification area was mailed to current job holders (e.g., teachers, 
principals and support staff) throughout the state. They were 
asked whether they had taught or used the content of the objective 
during the current year or in the past year. They were asked the 
amount of time they spent using the objectives and the extent to 
which they considered the objectives to be essential to their teach-
ing or instructional support area. From the "time spent" and "es-
sentiality" scales the contractor derived a composite index for 
each objective. Based on this index, the objectives were charac-
terized as "Preferred" (P) "Accepted" (A) (moderately job related), 
and "Not-as-Job Related" (NJR). 
Plaintiffs spent a great deal of time assailing the rationale and 
methodology of the job analysis. They argued that a job analysis 
should have focused on the functions and tasks teachers are ex-
pected to perform, not simply the subject matter objectives per-
ceived to be needed on the job. They argued that the contractor 
employed two incorrect rating scales; no opinions were sought 
from teacher educators, supervisors, administrators etc.; many of 
the objectives were too broad to rate properly; nine of the reviews 
were based on a response sample under fifteen, six under ten and 
one as Iowa two; the composite index was flawed for a number of 
conceptual and methodological reasons; minority opinions were 
ignored. 
4. Objective Selection: The results from step 3 were presented 10 
the subject-area curriculum committees to select the final set of 
objectives for which test items would be written. The committees 
chose 35 to 54 objectives per exam. 
Plaintiffs argued that the objective-selection process was vague 
and undocumented; hence, the process could not be audited. Plain-
tiffs pointed out that all the objectives were presented as job-relat-
ed to some degree; objectives with an NJR composite ratings were 
presented to the committee as not as job related rather than as 
non-job-related. Since some of these NJR objectives survived the 
selection process and were included on the test, the job analysis 
was meaningless because it failed to identify and isolate non-job-
related objectives. 
5. Item Writing: The contractor developed a pool of approx-
imately 150 multiple choice items for each content area; from this 
pool 120 items were to be included on the test, of which 100 were 
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to be scorable. The contractor checked the items for content valid-
ity, accuracy, sufficiency, clarity, and consistency. An item review 
conference then gave the curriculum committees an opportunity 
to review and revise the items in the pool. 
Plaintiffs argued that the quality of the item writing and the 
editorial review was poor; the size of the pool was inadequate 
forcing the inclusion of questionable items; the item review pro-
cess did not allow sufficient time for a careful consideration of all 
items; some changes recommended by the curriculum committees 
were not made; the items were not field tested; separate bias re-
view panels were not convened to screen the items for potential 
stereotyping or offensiveness; and no statistical item bias analyses 
were carried out. 
6. Content Validity Review: New review panels were formed to 
determine the content validity of each item and to set the cut-score 
for each test. Each panel member, working independently, was 
asked to rate each surviving item in the pool as "valid" i.e., an 
adequate measure of the objective in question, or "not valid." If 
the item was rated "not valid," the panelist was asked to indicate 
one of four reasons for the rating (inaccurate content; not a mea-
sure of the stated objective; tricky, ambiguous or misleading; or 
bias) . The panelist had the option of not rating an item that con-
tained unfamiliar content by choosing the "I don't know" re-
sponse. For each item rated "valid," cut-score data were generated 
by having the panelist decide whether or not entry level teachers 
should be able to answer the item correctly. Plaintiffs argued that 
the original rating forms and the data tapes from this review were 
not available for auditing; and that simply because an item was 
judged to measure an objective categorized as job related did not 
make the item itself job related. They attacked the contractor's 
cut-score methodology, arguing that among other things, it lacked 
support in the research literature, and that it produced artificially 
higher cut-scores than established methods. 
7. Test Assembly: Data from the previous step guided the assem-
bly and preparation of the tests for the first operational 
administration. 
Plaintiffs contended there were a large number of flawed items 
on the final test (i.e., the stem did not set a clear problem, the 
distracters were ambiguous, more than one distracter was cor-
rect); there were a large number of negatively stated items; items 
7. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL ISSUES 237 
appeared that measured NJR objectives; items appeared that were 
never reviewed by subject matter panels; that there were a num-
ber of miskeyed items; and item statistics from the first eight ad-
ministrations signaling possible problems were ignored. 
What's wrong with this legal-defensibility approach? Nothing, 
as long as satisfying the courts is the only objective. However, the 
essential question is whether the inferences, decisions, and de-
scriptions made about a candidate from his or her performance on 
the test are inadequately supported by this legalistic approach to 
validation . Following this tradition of validation in fact defines the 
kinds of explanations of a score that are sought. 
In the remainder of this chapter I examine the inferences that 
policy makers, the media, and the courts make from teacher cer-
tification tests. Second, I describe the mix of evidence needed to 
support such inferences and critique the shortcomings of present 
validation techniques. Third, I discuss the tension between exigen-
cies of the applied situation and the need for more thorough val-
idation efforts before the test is used. Fourth, I outline the three 
types of validity evidence that must be collected during the valida-
tion process. Finally, because the cut score triggers the inference or 
decision, I examine the issue of the validity of the cut score. 
THE VALIDITY OF 
TEACHER-CERTIFICATION TESTS 
According to the 1985 Standards for Educational and Psychological 
Testing, "Validity is the most important consideration in test eval-
uation . The concept refers to the appropriateness, meaningfulness, 
and usefulness of the specific inferences made from test scores" 
(AERA, APA, NCME, 1985, p. 9). Any analysis of validity, therefore, 
must begin with a description of the actual inferences that people 
make from a person's score on a teacher certification test. 
Inferences and Decisions From Teacher-
Certification Tests 
How do people interpret a candidate's performance on a teacher 
certification test-what inferences do they make about the per-
son? Consider the following: 
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• From an editorial in the Mobile Register:!7 
u.s. Middle District Judge Myron Thompson has sentenced hundreds 
of Mobi le public school students to an inferior education with his in-
credible order that the local school board give regular teaching posts to 
51 teachers who had failed to pass a basic competency test ... . 
Thompson said, in effect, "No! It doesn't matter if they can teach or 
not. Put them in the classrooms!" ("Filling Classrooms," 1983, p . 4-A). 
• From a news story in the Montgomery Advertiser concerning 
the State Board's rejection of a settlement it had earlier 
agreed to in the Allen v. Alabama case: 
Wednesday, Attorney General Charles Graddick 18 blasted the settle-
ment, saying it would lead to "the dumping of 650 incompetent school 
teachers into the state's public education system" (Cork, 1985, p. 2A). 
• From an editorial in the (Montgomery) Alabama Journal on 
the Eleventh Circuit's reinstatement of the settlement in Allen 
v. Alabama: 
The settlement was an utter sell-out of the teacher competency test-
ing program, which sought to do nothing more than keep incompe-
tents-regardless of race-out of the classroom. There is nothing 
wrong-and nothing discriminatory-about the state's expecting 
those who would teach to show certain levels of expertise in their 
particular fields and a degree of general knowledge. ("Living with 
error," 1987 p . 14) 
• From the Austin (Texas) American-Statesman: 
Requiring competency tests for teachers, the [Perot] committee esti-
mated, would rid the public schools of 20,000 incompetent teachers. 
(Copelin, 1984) 
• From a letter to the editor of the Montgomery Advertiser: 
Putting incompetent teachers into the classroom could prove to be 
education's Vietnam. Just as the United States could not win ·a war 
with only a half-hearted effort, neither can Alabama win a war on 
illiteracy with incompetent teachers. (Trotter, 1985, p. 12A) 
• From the Amarillo (Texas) News-Globe: 
Teachers would have to pass a test by June of 1986 to show that they 
were competent to teach. ("School Reform," 1984, p . 2A) 
17This editorial refers to the use of the NTE by the Mobile Alabama public 
schools to fire experienced teachers who failed to achieve the cut score of 500 or 
above. In an out-of-court settlement in York v. Mobile the use of the NTE was 
discontinued. ETS went on record as opposing the school board's use of the NTE for 
termination decisions. 
18Graddick, a candidate for Governor in the Democratic primary, made the 
settlement and the certification testing program an issue in his campaign. 
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• From the decision in United States v. South Carolina (1977) 
discussing the issue of false positive and false negative 
classifica tions: 
If there is a teacher shortage, a relatively high minimum score re-
quirement may mean that some classrooms will be without teachers, 
and it may be better to provide a less than fully competent teacher 
than no teacher at all. But to the extent that children are exposed to 
incompetent teachers, education suffers. (445 F .. Supp. 1094 at 1115) 
• From a January 8, 1980 Alabama State Board of Education 
resolution: 
[T]he State Superintendent of Education and the State Department 
of Education staff proposed to develop for Board ap-
proval ... criterion-referenced .. . exit professional competency 
tests in each of the teacher certification areas specified by Board 
policy, to measure the specific competencies which are considered 
necessary to successfully teach in classrooms in Alabama 
schools .... (Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Interveners' 1986, p . 15) 
• From the test contractor's Registration Bulletin for the Ala-
bama Initial Tt;acher Certification Testing Program: 
An individual's performance on a test is evaluated against an estab-
lished level of competence . ... As stated above, the test items were 
reviewed for minimum content knowledge competence that (a) prac-
ticing Alabama teachers must have in order to successfully teach in 
the classroom, or (b) if in an instructional support personnel posi-
tion, must have in order to be successful in the position. The pass/fail 
scores clearly define those individuals demonstrating sufficient com-
petence in the teaching or instructional support field (Plaintiffs' and 
Plaintiff-Interveners' 1986, p. 53). 
• Last, but far from least, from an August 23, 1987 news story in 
the Savannah News-Press headlined School Firings Praised: 
Although five Chatham County teachers are among the ranks of 
327 teachers state-wide unable to continue teaching in Georgia, U.S . 
Education Secretary William Bennett assured the state Saturday 
that it is setting a good example by barring the teachers from the 
classroom because they failed a new certification test . 
"It is a great thing for the state of Georgia," Bennett said. "It is a 
declaration that the state is not willing to have incompetent teachers 
in the classroom." (p. 1C) 
There is no shortage of analogous examples. What's clear is that 
people make inferences from teacher-certification-test scores 
about a teacher's con:tpetence. Editorial writers, newspaper report-
ers, politicians, blue-ribbon committee members, State Board 
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members, judges, ordinary citizens, even test contractors, and yes, 
the then U.S. Education Secretary all seem to agree that teacher-
certification tests measure some aspect of teacher competence. 
Further, this competence has a referent-classroom performance. 
Whatever it is, it's necessary for successful teaching. 
Additionally, note the implicit-sometimes explicit-a priori 
conviction that the test in fact correctly distinguishes between 
competent and incompetent teachers. People accept the test as valid 
without ever seeing or taking it. As feminists have come to realize, 
whoever names the world owns it (McFague, 1982) Many people 
have a literalistic mentality and consequently, the test is simply 
what the contractor or agency says it is. Naming the test reifies it. 
If it's called a teacher-certification test, a priori it's an indicator of 
competence. When people reify a test they are no longer like the 
Wizard of Oz who knew green glasses made Oz green, they believe 
that Oz is green (Turbayne, 1962). Naming something can also 
affect attitudes at a profound level. This affective component ex-
plains why many people find it difficult to understand why plain-
tiffs challenge a teacher-certification test that "obviously" weeds 
out "incompetents." 
Proponents of teacher-competency testing are quick to point out 
that the competence being measured is necessary, but not suffi-
cient, for successful classroom performance. Passing the test does 
not mean the teacher will be successful; the test simply doesn't 
purport to measure all of the knowledge and skills necessary· to 
teach. These tests only measure certain aspects of the job. How-
ever, this argument leaves something important unsaid . If the test 
is a valid measure of some subset of necessary, but not sufficient, 
knowledge, skills, and abilities, and a person fails it, then it follows 
that the probability is high that the person is incompetent. There-
fore, the person cannot be minimally successful in the classroom. 
In other words, at least for those labeled incompetent, successful 
classroom performance is still the ultimate criterion. I now turn to 
lines of evidence that are needed to substantiate inferences about 
competence. 
Lines of Validity Evidence 
Court decisions apart, what kind of evidence is needed to sustain 
an inference that a candidate is incompetent to perform success-
7. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL ISSUES 241 
fully in a classroom and, thereby, to justify the subsequent deci-
sion not to certify the person? The 1985 Standards point out that 
traditionally there are three categories of validity evidence: con-
tent-related, criterion-related, and construct-related evidence. The 
Standards also state that rigorous distinctions between categories 
are not possible, and that 
An ideal validation includes several types of evidence, which span 
all three of the traditional categories. Other things being equal, 
more sources of evidence are better than fewer. However, the quality 
of the evidence is of primary importance, and a single line of solid 
evidence is preferable to numerous lines of evidence of questionable 
quality.l9 (p. 9) 
Validation can no longer be a question of one predominant type of 
validity evidence nor of one predominate method to gather that 
type of evidence. Rather, the question should be how the three 
types of validity and various methods of gathering evidence about 
them should be joined so as to produce a solid, overall line of 
evidence in support of whatever particular type of inferences or 
decisions is under consideration. 
As we saw, contractors presently are arguing for the single line 
of content validity evidence to justify the use of teacher-certifica-
tion tests. How is this all consuming line of evidence gathered? The 
approach constitutes a closed system of soliciting teacher judg-
ments at key steps in the test construction process (i.e., job analy-
sis, content validation, standard setting). Content-related evidence 
of job relatedness ultimately comes down to what panels of teach-
ers-about whom we know very little-consider or feel are the 
skills, knowledge, and abilities needed to function successfully in 
the classroom (Madaus 1986; Madaus & Pullin, 1987). 
The question then becomes "How strong is this judgmental line 
of evidence?" As far back as 1934, Tyler, describing the practice of 
19Defendan ts in Allen v. Alabama (1985) emphasized the last clause and linked it 
to the following sentence from the Professional and Occupational Licensure and 
Certification chapter to argue that criterion-related evidence wasn't needed and a 
strong single line of content related evidence was sufficient; "Investigations of 
criterion-related validity are more problematic in the context of licensure or cer-
tification than in any employment settings" (p. 63). 
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validating 10 tests against teacher's judgments of student intel-
ligence, pointed out that using this judgment approach exclusively 
means that the test is never more valid than the teachers' judg-
ments. More recently, Haney, Madaus, and Kreitzer (1987) pointed 
out that item bias is the only area of testing where judgmental 
methods have been closely compared with empirical methods. 
They pointed to Jensen's (1980) conclusion based on an extensive 
review that, "claims of test bias cannot be supported by subjective 
judgments regarding the item content" (p. 371). They concluded 
that the literature on judgmental versus statistical methods of bias 
detection is a real source of disquiet when one tries to justify the 
judgmental approach exclusively to establish test validity. It is in-
teresting to note that defendants in Allen v. Alabama used this same 
item bias literature to justify not convening separate panels to 
examine items for bias, offensiveness, and stereotyping. 
Granted, teacher judgments carefully elicited form an impor-
tant line of validity evidence. However, a single line of evidence 
based exclusively on opinions is, I submit, insufficient to sustain 
the types of inferences just described (Madaus & Pullin, 1987). I 
believe that the validation of teacher-certification tests must in-
clude evidence from all three traditional validity categories. The 
inference made from a teacher-certification test is too complex, the 
decision not to certify too important, and the potential harm to 
individuals too great, to be supported by a single line of validity 
evidence. Validation if done properly is hermeneutic, and to arrive 
at the meaning behind a test score, all three kinds of evidence are 
needed. Further, for any of the three lines of evidence there is no 
one best method for collecting the data; instead multiple meth-
odologies must be employed to better illuminate the question 
being investigated. 
Validation and Applied Testing 
Before developing further the reasons for three distinct lines of 
evidence, I need to raise one other very important point about 
validation. Validation is an ongoing, additive process of accumu-
lating evidence, not a single study. However, the open endedness of 
validation and the necessity for multiple lines of evidence using 
multiple methodologies immediately pose very real problems for 
contractors. Contractors, after all work in the applied, commer-
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cial, competitive, litigious, nonregulated, business world of testing. 
As just noted, a fundamental characteristic of validation is a 
search for the meaning behind a test score . Validation is ultimate-
ly a scientific enterprise. It calls for iconoclastic speculation, suspi-
cion, doubt, autonomous judgment, deliberate hard mindedness, 
open-ended tensive enquiry, and a willingness to follow the evi-
dence wherever it may lead. Contractors, however, are basically 
technicians, not scientists. They are forced to have can-do men-
talities, which focus more on delivering a product that will stand 
up in court than on searching for meaning behind a test score. 
Contractors have to deliver an operational test by a fixed date, 
sometimes as quickly as 6 to 8 months from the award of the 
contract. To make good contractual obligations they rely on a stan-
dard, stereotyped technology that they know the courts have ac-
cepted. There simply isn't time to implement an integrated, multi-
faceted, ongoing validation strategy. Furthermore, contracts are 
not funded for comprehensive, ongoing validation efforts. Contrac-
tors are also acutely aware that pursuing certain lines of evidence 
is a risky business given the possibility of a legal challenge (Yalow, 
Collins, & Popham, 1986). Finally, because con tractors must pro-
duce a product that is "valid" to get paid, they avoid studies that 
are open to disconfirmation. Simply put, asking disconfirming hy-
potheses about their product poses a real conflict of interest for 
contractors. Consequently, habit always triumphs over novelty 
and they cling to proven techniques and institutionalized formula-
tions that deliver a positive result. 
Obviously, in the real world of applied testing, validation can-
not be altogether open ended. That's not the issue. Nor is it an 
issue of whether to test or not. Tests are potentially too valuable a 
source of important information about individuals and institu-
tions. The critical practical issues are: (a) How much validity evi-
dence is enough before the test can be used operationally? and (2) 
How do we get around the conflict of interest inherent in valida-
tion in the applied situation? 
Determining that a teacher-certification test is ready for use 
involves balancing ethical and practical issues as well as indi-
vidual and social interests. On the one hand, contractors and agen-
cies have an ethical duty to provide the proper kinds of evidence to 
support inferences of competence in the classroom. There is also 
little doubt that people can be harmed by a test contractor's prod-
uct. On the basis of a test score a person is permitted to teach or 
not; can be stigmatized with the label incompetent; can have his or 
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herself concept diminished; can be hurt psychologically and finan-
cially. Similarly, teacher-training institutions can be damaged by 
decisions made about them on the basis of test information. On the 
other hand tests can provide valuable information about indi-
viduals and institutions. Policy makers and the public have come 
to expect that test information be used to help protect society from 
incompetent teachers and inferior institutions. Finally, there is no 
such thing as a perfect test. Even the most thoroughly validated 
test will produce false positive and negative classifications. In-
ferences are always problematic. Validation offers a reasoned de-
fense for inferences, not proof. 
Given these competing factors, the question then becomes, 
"What mechanism should be used to decide if the test is ready to 
be used to make high-stakes inferences and decisions?" One analo-
gy, a lbeit incomplete, is to drug testing. At what point is it safe to 
permit the operational use of a new drug? The decision isn't left up 
to the drug company. There are guidelines from the FDA on the 
studies that need to be done; and the results are evaluated by the 
FDA before approving the product for commercial use. Testing has 
no analogous review mechanism. When the contractor delivers the 
test, it is used to make important decisions. The profession needs 
to come to grips with this value-laden, political question of when a 
test is ready to be used operationally. No resolution, I submit, is to 
be found in the Standards, the EEOC Guidelines, the courts, nor the 
contractor's proclamation of validity . 
The profession must a lso come to grips with the knotty issue of 
the conflict of interest contractors find themselves in when val-
idating their own test. Of course the contractor must be involved 
in validation . The test construction process itself is an integral 
part of the process. However, test validation must continue well 
beyond the test-construction phase, and must actively pursue dis-
confirming hypotheses. The answer to this dilemma is, I believe, 
an independent test-auditing agency analogous to the FDA. Such 
an agency would provide contractors with guidelines for leaving a 
proper audit trail during the test construction phase and would 
audit this phase. It would provide state agencies with guidelines 
for validation study designs to test disconfirming hypotheses after 
the test construction stage, and it would audit this phase as well. 
These audits would guide the agency in making recommendations 
to the contracting agencies about whether the test is ready for 
operational use. The profession must take the lead here or legisla-
tureS eventually will. New York's "Truth in Testing" legislation is 
but an initial shot across testing's bow. An independent, profes-
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sionally sponsored, nongovernmental agency is preferable to the 
governmental FDA model. 
Currently, the closest thing to what I have in mind is the ETS 
internal auditing process. On assuming the presidency of ETS in 
1981, Gregory Anrig initiated an audit process to assure that each 
of the company's products was in compliance with the ETS 
Standards of Quality and Fairness. 20 An Officer of Corporate Quali-
ty Assurance was established to oversee the audits and the imple-
mentation of any recommendations coming out of an audit. Each 
ETS program is reviewed at least every 3 years. A Visiting Com-
mittee annually reviews the audit process itself and examines the 
findings from the yearly audits. The Visiting Committee reports 
directly to the ETS Trustee Committee on Public Responsibility. 
Interestingly, this past year the NTE program was audited. The 
Visiting Committee observed that 
The role of the tests that comprise the NTE Programs-in qualifying 
candidates for admission to colleges of education, certification into 
the profession, and the identification for career ladder and master 
teaching programs- along with increasing public concern for the 
quality of our teaching force, guarantees them a place as one of the 
more controversial testing programs within ETS. (Report of the 
1987 ETS Visiting Committee, 1987, p. 3) 
The Visiting Committee then raised a series of questions about the 
NTE programs tests: 
• Are the NTE Programs contributing to the improvement of 
teacher education and practice? 
• Do the NTE Programs have a negative effect on the recruit-
ment of minorities into the teaching profession? 
• Are the NTE Programs tests valid for the inferences commonly 
drawn from their uses? 
• Can ETS continue to rely on studies undertaken by state-level 
clients using the NTE Programs tests as their primary source 
of validity? (p. 9) 
The Committee went on to recommend that: 
In light of [its] concerns, and those of others, regarding current NTE 
Programs tests, along with the changes occurring in teacher educa-
20The Standards of Quality and Fairness are a set of standards that, in my opin-
ion go beyond the 1985 Standards in outlining criteria for test development and use. 
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tion and the teaching profession, ... the talents, technical expertise, 
and resources of ETS be directed toward researching and developing 
new methods of teacher evaluation. [That] would: (1) respect the 
complexities of the work of teachers at different grade levels and in 
different subject or specialty areas, (2) be valid measures of the knowl-
edge and skills teachers need to perform competently [i talics added], 
and (3) not discriminate against minorities (p. 9) 
The audit process is taken very seriously at ETS and is a com-
mendable effort at public responsibility . However, it is not the 
answer for the entire industry. It lacks the authority of an external 
independent auditing body. Unfortunately, it certainly would be 
perceived by some critics of testing as self-serving. Further, it is 
beyond the resources of smaller contractors. Nonetheless, it pro-
vides an exce.1lent model for what an independent agency might 
do. 
I now turn to a closer examination of the need for construct, 
content, and criterion-related evidence, problems with current 
validation efforts, and the issue of the validity of the cut score. 
Construct-Related Evidence 
Inferences people make about a teacher's competence are in-
ferences about a construct. Competence is a construct, and there-
fore construct validation is essential for any teacher certification 
test. The construct, competence in the classroom, must be "em-
bedded in a conceptual framework, no matter how imperfect that 
framework may be" (AERA, APA, NCME, 1985, p. 9). Development 
of a conceptual framework for teacher competence must involve a 
functional analysis of what minimally competent teachers actu-
ally do in their classrooms. This analysis must start from below 
with the work of teachers and move then to construct definition. 
Further, a functional analysis must be specific to the certification 
area in question. Teaching is not a generic profession. Only by 
functionally analyzing the different certification areas can the sub-
set of skills, knowledge, and abilities common to all teaching areas 
be identified. A functional approach would also answer the ques-
tion of whether a generic professional-skills test required for cer-
tification of all teachers makes any sense. I feel that extant generic, 
multiple-choice teacher-certification tests make little sense, and 
are simply not valid (Madaus & Pullin, 1987). 
Although a theoretical, or structural analysis can also be help-
ful, the functional, area-by-area approach to defining job compe-
tencies should shed more light on the critical ingredients needed to 
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be minimally successful in the classroom. Not all of the ingre-
dients that emerge-in fact probably very few-can be measured 
by the current, administratively convenient multiple-choice tech-
nology. However, by illuminating what's possible within the limits 
of this technology the first step in the construct validation of such 
tests has begun. 
The functional approach goes beyond the current practice of 
mailing lists of objectives to teachers for them to rate, although, if 
done carefully, a survey of teachers' opinions on the aspects identi-
fied from the functional analysis contributes to the web of con-
struct-related evidence. Content- and criterion-related evidence, 
although contributing to construct validation, is insufficient. The 
1985 Standards remind us that: The process of compiling con-
struct-related evidence for test validity starts with test develop-
ment and continues until the pattern of empirical relationships 
between test scores and other variables clearly indicates the mean-
ing of the test score [italics added). (AERA, APA, NCME, 1985, p. 10) 
The 1985 Standards describes the process of compiling construct-
related evidence, along with possible sources of, and techniques 
for collecting such evidence. These suggestions must be taken se-
riously when validating teacher certification tests. 
Content-Related Evidence 
As just noted, content validation is the favorite, exclusive ap-
proach of contractors building teacher-certification tests. Content-
related evidence is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in 
validating teacher-certification tests. However, if we are searching 
for the meaning behind a score on a such a test, then we need to 
reexamine the techniques currently used to solicit this evidence. 
Cronbach, writing in the context of program evaluation, calls 
for" a bundle of studies [using] different techniques to examine 
subquestions" (Cronbach & et al 1980, p. 73). Within the same 
evaluation context Cooley and Bickel (1986) pointed out that mul-
tiple approaches to examining a question deepen an understand-
ing of the phenomenon under investigation. This is certainly good 
advice for those validating teacher-certification tests. Current con-
tent validation methodology has become institutionalized, a co-
coon for confirmation. Disconfirming hypotheses about content 
relevance are not examined. To the degree that expert opinion 
varies as a function of the way it is elicited or quantified, in-
ferences made from scores are suspect. 
For content-related evidence to be believable, we need to learn a 
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lot more about things we now take for granted such as: how well 
panel members understand the tasks they are asked to do; how 
much response set influences the process as panel members be-
come absorbed in the process; how much the meaning of direc-
tions are interpreted and prejudged by individuals according to 
their own framework; how easily panel members recognize flaws 
in items; and how time constraints affect the task. We need to 
learn more about how teacher opinion varies as a function of the 
composition of the panels, of the wording of the judgment question 
put to them, and of the way the results are quantified. The final set 
of items chosen to measure successful job performance should be 
robust enough to emerge consistently under different conditions of 
gathering judgments about their relevance. Madaus and Pullin 
(1987) offered a sample of "what if questions" that test the robust-
ness of teacher judgments about test content. 
There is an interesting paradox associated with the current con-
tent-validation approach. Many teacher certification test items 
that successfully survive the content-validation panel review are 
roundly criticized by test reviewers. This contradictory phenome-
non spans the decades and cuts across a number of different tests. 
(e.g., Buros, 1938; 1953; 1959; 1965; 1972; 1978; Darling-Ham-
mond, 1986; Koerner 1963; Madaus, 1986; Madaus & Pullin, 1987; 
Melnick, 1987; Melnick & Pullin, 1987; and if it is ever released the 
trail transcript in Allen v. Alabama; see Haney et aI., 1987, for 
former examples and a more detailed discussion). Further, this 
criticism isn't limited to one or two bad items that may have 
slipped by accidently. It blankets a host of items. Mitchell's com-
ments on the item quality of the 1976 NTE captures the flavor of 
this history of criticism: 
The items on the Professional Education test should be carefully 
scrutinized by potential users . Some of the items seem to smack of 
professional shibboleths, others have shaky research foundations, 
others seem to reflect the values of the writer more than the sub-
stance of the field, others are simplistic, others are combinations of 
these. Some items of course, are wholly acceptable. But if the items 
are taken as a whole, it is in fact difficult to believe that these items 
adequately sample from the professional preparation provided by 
most teacher training programs. (p. 517) 
The regularity and similarity of this item criticism, across the 
years and across different contractors' tests calls into question 
current content-related evidence, and illuminates the need for a 
careful evaluation of the traditional techniques used by contrac-
tors. At the very least this history of item criticism is indicative of 
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the fact that typical content review panels simply aren't sensitive 
to many problems inherent in the objectives and multiple-choice 
items they are reviewing. 
Questionable items are a serious threat to validity when the 
inferences about a person are triggered automatically by a cut 
score on the test. Each item-good, bad, or indifferent-contrib-
utes one point to a person's score. To illustrate the damage done by 
the presence of questionable items, plaintiffs in Allen v. Alabama 
constructed what became referred to in the trial as failure charts 
for each test.21 Persons who failed the test were identified. Their 
answers to the questionable items were then recorded. This gave a 
crude estimate of the extent to which answering a questionable 
item incorrectly contributed to falling below the cut score. A con-
siderable number of candidates who were denied certification fell 
below the cut score due in part to answering a subset of th~ ques-
tionable items incorrectly. For those close to the cut score one or 
two questionable items may have made the difference between 
passing and failing. Of course we don't know how these candidates 
would have answered flawless items measuring the same objective 
had they appeared. That's not the point. The point is that the 
inference of incompetence made about these candidates was cor-
rupted by the presence of questionable items. 
In summary, content-related evidence is essential in the overall 
validation of teacher-certification tests. However, the track record 
for content-validation studies of teacher-certification tests to date 
is poor. The meaning behind a test score is not enhanced from 
results obtained using present content-validity techniques. The re-
sults do not contribute to construct validation. The methodology 
endorses many dubious items as job related. We need to begin to 
carefully reassess the methodologies that have evolved to collect 
such information. We must ask the extent to which the results, on 
which everything hinges at the present time, are method depen-
dent. To obtain sound overall content-related evidence we need to 
begin to employ different techniques with different types of panels. 
Criterion-Related Evidence 
If teacher-certification tests measure important aspects of suc-
cessful classroom performance, scores on such tests should corre-
21 Items were labeled questionable if there were judged ambiguous, miskeyed, 
having no best answer, measuring trivial content, or context dependent for an 
answer. Because the items are protected by court order, and the testimony was in 
Camera, I am unable to offer concrete examples. Defendants challenged some of the 
items characterized as questionable, but not the majority. 
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late with criterion measures of such performance. The record here 
isn't good either. Reviews of attempts to correlate scores on teach-
er-certification exams and performance in the classroom show 
that "teacher tests have little if any power to predict how well 
people perform as teachers, whether that performance is judged by 
ratings of college supervisory personnel, ratings by principals, stu-
dent ratings or achievement gains made by students taught" 
(Haney et al., 1987, p. 199). 
In the 1930s Ralph Tyler reminded the measurement communi-
ty that indirect (multiple choice) indicators must be validated 
against direct indicators of the construct of interest. Contractors 
building teacher-certification tests seem to have forgotten this ad-
vice or dismissed it as impractical. Instead, they argue that ade-
quate criterion measures of successful classroom performance 
simply aren't available. Although this may be true, it is an admis-
sion that contractors know next to nothing about the construct 
that they are trying to measure. This admission also undercuts the 
accuracy of the so called job analysis portion of the content-valid-
ity approach. A proper functional analysis of the job at the outset 
should produce direct indicators of the construct and also suggest 
ways to measure them. 
The national movement to hold teachers accountable should 
eventually lead to the development of better, more systematic 
techniques to evaluate educational personnel. Decisions about 
such things as merit pay, tenure, and career ladders cry out for 
such criteria. What emerges from new efforts to evaluate teachers 
may offer a subset of criteria against which performance on teach-
er-certification tests can eventually be validated. 
Another argument proffered as to why criterion-related evi-
dence isn't needed for teacher-certification tests is that such evi-
dence isn't collected for licensure tests in other professions such as 
law, medicine, or nursing. One reason for this absence is that can-
didates in those other professions go into a wide range of very 
different types of jobs. For example, a candidate who passes the 
bar exam might practice real estate law, corporate law, criminal 
law, and so forth. There are so many job paths open to the new 
lawyer that the criterion problem is simply insurmountable. Or so 
the argument goes. 
The situation in education is different. A teacher applies for a 
very specific certification; one tied to a grade level, subject field, or 
speciality area. Unlike lawyers or doctors, teachers don't get a 
generic license to practice. Thus, for each test particular to a cer-
tification area, individualized criteria of competence are needed 
and should be possible to obtain. With 30 or more separate cer-
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tification areas this won't be an easy task. However, we have to 
begin. And despite the difficulty, I feel that criterion-related evi-
dence, whether predictive or concurrent, is absolutely necessary to 
validate properly the commonly made inferences about minimally 
successful classroom performance. Without such evidence we are 
locked into the closed circle of judgmental evidence of content-
relevance. 
The Cut Score 
Essential to any validation of teacher-certification tests are studies 
of the validity of the cut score. It is the cut score, after all, that 
triggers both the inferences about a person's competence, and the 
decision to certify or not. However, to the best of my knowledge, 
there have been no attempts to validate the cut scores used with 
teacher-certification tests . Presently cut scores are set by having 
panels make judgments about the expected performance of mini-
mally competent teachers on each item. The results are then aggre-
gated to arrive at a cut score. We have already discussed problems 
associated with the closed system of relying exclusively on panel 
plebiscites about objectives or items. Those same problems apply 
with equal force to the cut-score process. 
We already know that cut scores on teacher-certification tests 
are method dependen t (Berk, 1986, p. 163; Goertz & Pi tcher, 1985; 
Poggio, Glasnap, Miller, Tollefson, & Jaeger, 1986). (This body of 
literature is a further reason to investigate the method dependence 
of current content-validation practices.) The practical implica-
tions of this dependence is far from trivial. Using the Goertz and 
Pitcher data, Haney et al. (1987) calculated the proportion of ex-
aminees in the 1982-1984 national sample of NTE candidates who 
would pass or fail using the highest and the lowest cut scores found 
across the various states using the tests. The figures ranged from 
75% to 95% passing the Communication Skills subtest, 67% to 91 % 
passing the General Knowledge subtest, and 78% to 98% passing 
the Professional Knowledge sub test. These data caused Haney et 
al. (1987) to ask "Is there really this much variation from one state 
to the next, in the skills and knowledge level needed to be a mini-
mally successful teacher?" (p. 201-202) Despite questions like 
these about the underlying construct of teacher competence, judg-
mental cut-score methodology presently rules the roost. We need 
to validate any cut score through an empirical examination of the 
degree to which it correctly separates those with insufficient 
knowledge and skill from those with adequate prerequisites (Ma-
daus, 1986). 
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It is undeniable that at some point a judgment has to be made 
about where to set the cut score. However, such a judgment should 
be informed by data on the number of possible false positives and 
false negatives associated with the selection. Mass screening tech-
niques in medicine provide an analogy for what is needed. To 
screen hospital blood-bank donors for possible anicteric hepatitis, 
measures of serum enzyme are employed (Colton, 1974). To set a 
cut score for decisions about the blood's acceptability pathologists 
plotted the distributions of the serum glutamic pyruvic trans-
aminase (SGPT) (transformed to the logarithm to base 10) of 
healthy individuals and those with hepatocellular damage. In-
formed cost-benefit judgments can then be made about where in 
the overlap zone to place the cut score to minimize either of these 
unavoidable misclassifications. 
The medical example just described is, of course, nothing more 
than the contrasting-groups method used in some minimum com-
petency graduation testing programs. Such a technique could be 
used for teacher certification tests. Naturally, the underlying scale 
of the construct teacher competence will not be physical. But the 
contrasting-groups method for cut-score setting could be · em-
ployed if serious construct and criterion-related evidence were 
available. 
There is also an analytical approach to the problem of setting a 
cut score on a teacher certification test. It is based on the fact that 
a relatively small number of persons tested are actually incompe-
tent. Haney et al. (1987) found that estimates of the percentage of 
incompetents in the teacher corps are similar to estimates of in-
competence associated with other professions- about 10%. When 
base rates of incompetence are low, even using a screening test 
that is highly accurate, you run the risk of doing great damage to 
candidates falsely labeled incompetent. I describe three examples 
that illustrate the point. 
Recently in the APA Monitor John Bales (1987) reported on the 
testimony of psychologist Edward Katin to a congressional panel 
investigating the use of the polygraph in employment settings. 
Katin pointed out that a relatively small number of people tested 
by a polygraph will be dishonest or deceptive. Using available 
estimates of 85% accuracy for the polygraph, and a 10% "dishon-
est" estimate, he provided an example of what happens under 
these conditions when 1,000 employees are screened. The poly-
graph would identify 85 of the 100 dishonest employees, but would 
misidentify as dishonest 15% or 135 honest employees. Of the 220 
"suspects" (85 + 135),61% are innocent. He concluded that it is a 
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mathematical reality that the majority of suspects are, in fact, 
innocent. Nonetheless, a cloud of suspicion blankets these inno-
cents. 
Light (1987) offered another provocative example from wide-
spread screening for drugs or AIDS. He asked the simple question 
"Of all the people that the drug test (or an AIDS test) classifies as 
having drugs (or AIDS) what proportion really has it?" (p. 51). He 
used the following three figures to answer it: (a) an estimate of 1 % 
for the proportion of people who actually have AIDS or routinely 
take drugs; (b) an estimate of 95% for the accuracy of a screening 
test to detect drugs or the AIDS virus when a person really has 
them; and (c) an estimate of 95% for the accuracy of the test to 
detect the absence of drugs or the AIDS virus. Using these three 
estimates he found that "of all the people the test categorizes as 
having drugs (or AIDS), only 15% really do!" (p. 51). Even a test that 
is 100% accurate in detecting people who do take drugs (or have 
AIDS) hardly changes the situation. Under this assumption, 17% 
would be misidentified; 83% of all those labeled as positive would 
be falsely accused . Needless to say, a false accusation in such a 
matter can seriously harm a person. 
But what have hepatitis screening, polygraphs, and drug test-
ing, all involving physical measures, to do with teacher-certifica-
tion testing? The situations are analogous in that the potential for 
harm to those falsely labeled incompetent is great, and the propor-
tion of teacher candidates who are actually incompetent is proba-
bly 10w-1O%. This is particularly true when you consider the fact 
that few people in testing or education could claim anything near 
the accuracy for teacher tests ascribed to the polygraph, urine, or 
blood tests. 
Haney, et al. (1987) simulated what might be happening in the 
teacher-certification-testing situation. They assumed that 10% of 
the candidates are, in fact, incompetent. Based on a review of the 
literature they estimated a correlation of .20 between present cer-
tification tests and a measure of teacher quality corrected for unre-
liability . They then used the Taylor and Russell (1939) tables to 
estimate a 1 % increase in selection efficiency in using the test over 
random selection. 
From the state 's point of view, such a small increase in selection 
efficiency might appear worthwhile. However, it hides the balance 
of correct and incorrect decisions made using the test. To clarify 
this balance, they carried out a simulation. They assumed an esti-
mate of incompetence of 10%, and a correlation of 0.20 between the 
test and criterion measure. Further, they assumed both the test and 
254 MADAUS 
the measure of teacher quality were normally distributed. Next 
they set the cut score on the test and the measure of teacher quality 
at 1.28 standard deviations below the mean. Using a Monte Carlo 
simulation they estimated: (a) the correct acceptances (above the 
cut score on both variables); (b) the correct rejections (below the cut 
score on both variables); (c) the false acceptances (above the cut 
score on the test, but below on the criterion); and (d) the false 
rejections (below the cut score on the test, but above the cut score on 
the criterion). As expected, about 10% of the cases were below the 
cut score on the test and on the criterion. However, only 1.8 out of 
100 cases were below the cut score on both measures. Moreover, 
they found that more than 80% of the cases below the cut score on 
the test were above the cut score on the criterion. In other words, 
more than 80% of the rejections based on the test would be false ones. 
The use of a test for widespread screening of teachers (given the 
previously described assumptions) identifies less than 20% of the 
candidates who truly fall below the cut score on the real criterion of 
interest, competence in the classroom. A success rate of 20% must 
be balanced against the staggering cost of an 80% false negative 
rate. 
These three examples, I think, argue for the need for both ana-
lytic and empirical investigations of the validity of any cut score 
used for the widespread screening of teacher candidates. We can't 
continue to rely exclusively on teacher judgments about individual 
items as the exclusive basis for setting a cut-score-not if we are 
serious about making inferences about competence in the 
classroom. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts are a world unto themselves, a world that gives con-
tractors a relatively simple formula for validating teacher cer-
tification tests. Although contractors need to be cognizant of 
judicial opinions about employment tests, they should acknowl-
edge that a legal definition of validity is inadequate . A legally 
defensible certification test is presently obtained at the expense of 
a proper search for the meaning behind scores on these tests. It 
isn't easy to properly validate certification tests in the applied 
situation. But in the end, if the test survived a proper validation 
effort, it would be legally defensible. 
It is an inescapable fact of life that all manner of people use the 
tests to make inferences about potential competence in the class-
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room. On the basis of these inferences, state agencies make deci-
sions that can adversely affect the careers of numerous candidates. 
The nature of these inferences demands construct, content, and 
criterion-related evidence for support. If we are serious about 
keeping incompetents out of the classroom then we must get a lot 
more serious about comprehensive test validation. Otherwise, 
teacher-certification testing is nothing more than a slick public 
relations ploy. 
The dilemma of the ongoing nature of validation and the exigen-
cies of the applied situation must be addressed-and quickly . 
Guidelines for when a test has been validated sufficiently for oper-
ational use must be developed. The profession must come to grips 
with the conflict of interest that is present when test contractors 
are the only validators of their own secure products, particularly 
when they approach validation exclusively from the perspective of 
defending their product in court. Some independent, mutually re-
spected agency is needed to audit contractors' work during test 
construction and to apply professional standards for validation 
after test construction is over. 
I opened the chapter with the validation metaphor of the snark 
hunt from Lewis Carroll. I'd like to close with a paragraph from 
the preface to The Hunting of The Snark as metaphor for what the 
quest for a legally defensible test is doing to teacher certification 
testing: 
The Bellman, who was almost morbidly sensitive about ap-
pearances, used to have the bowsprit unshipped once or twice a 
week to be revarnished; and it more than once happened, when the 
time came for replacing it, that no one on board could remember 
which end of the ship it belonged to. They knew it was not of the 
slightest use to appeal to the Bellman about it-he would only refer 
to his Naval Code, and read out in pathetic tones Admirality Instruc-
tions which none of them had ever been able to understand-so it 
generally ended in its being fastened on, any how, across the rudder. 
The helmsman used to stand by with tears in his eyes: he knew it was 
all wrong, but alas! Rule 42 of the Code, "No one shall speak to the 
Man at the Helm," had been completed by the Bellman himself with 
the words "and the Man at the helm shall speak to no one." So re-
monstrance was impossible, and no steering could be done till the 
next varnishing day. During these bewildering intervals the ship 
usually sailed backwards. (p. 8-9) 
Teacher certification testing currently is a rudderless enterprise, 
sailing backwards through a legal sea of codes and court opinion. 
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It's time to repair, and put in its correct place the rudder of test 
validity. 
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